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The Covid-19 pandemic is the worst of all the crises that we had been experiencing until 
now, on a global level. The impact has been tremendous with multiple social and 
economic dimensions. Although contingency measures such as social distancing, 
quarantine, border shutdown are deemed to be necessary in the effort to “flatten the 
curve”, the interruption of the real economy cannot be disregarded. Additionally, a lot 
of concerns have been raised as regards a looming recession.  
Fortunately, at the point the pandemic emerged, European Banks were in a better 
position compared to the previous crisis, yet, a number of deficiencies still exist in the 
sector, which have been the reason for the slow recovery after the GFC and thus low 
profitability.  
Given the dimension of the phenomenon, it is unlikely that the banking industry will 
remain unscathed. Fiscal and monetary policies can manage to tackle the situation, at 
least for the time being, but they cannot certainly provide profits for banks. 
In this context Consolidation (both domestic and cross-border) through mergers and 
acquisitions, can be an effectual channel to manage and confront the existing vulnerable 
aspects of the sector. Domestic consolidation could be an adequate response, for 
instance,  to overcapacity, poor profitability issues or legacy problems (NPLs) , 
respectively cross – border consolidation could contribute to a more resilient banking 
system in terms of risk diversification, risk sharing and simultaneously facilitate deeper  
banking integration, which can be the foundation for the safe and sound banking system 
the European Union and the Eurozone need , in order to  attain  financial stability, a 
prerequisite factor in order to confront any future downturn in economic cycles. 
 




Eirini Stavroula Nikolaidou 




  -i- 
Acknowledgements 
 
I would like to express my appreciation to my supervisor Dr Nikoletta Kleftouri whose 
guidance and support have been invaluable throughout this study.  
Further, I would also like to express my sincere gratitude to my University as well as to 
all my professors, regarding the stimulating journey of knowledge that I have been 
experiencing during this LLM program. 
Last, but not least many thanks to my beloved parents Leonidas & Maria Nikolaidis, a 




  -iii- 
Contents          
ABSTRACT ........................................................................................................................ III 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ................................................................................................... III 
CONTENTS ........................................................................................................................ III 
INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................ 5 
1.EUROPEAN BANKING UNION (EBU): AN EVOLUTIONARY PROJECT ........................... 8 
1.1 THE RATIONALE BEHIND THE CREATION OF EBU .................................................................... 8 
1.2 THE THREE PILLARS ......................................................................................................... 10 
1.3 THE ROLE AND COMMUNICATION IMPACT OF ECB ............................................................... 12 
2.VULNERABILITIES OF THE BANKING SECTOR AND DRIVERS FOR 
CONSOLIDATION……………………………………………………………………………………………………….15 
2.1 EXISTING VULNERABILITIES .............................................................................................. 15 
2.2 DRIVERS FOR CONSOLIDATION ......................................................................................... 20 
      2.2.1 A microeconomic analysis of M&As ................................................................. 22 
     2.2.2 A macroeconomic analysis of cross-border M&As ............................................ 26 
    2.2.3 Potential barriers to cross-border consolidation……………………………………………27 
     2.2.4 The impact of European Banking Integration on sustainable economic    
growth……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….33 
3.EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE: THE PARADIGM OF 
SPAIN……………………………….............................................................................................35 
      The Spanish Savings Banks (Cajas)………………………………………………………………………. 36 
 
      The problem………………………………………………………………………………………………………….37 
      The response: a consolidation program (FROB 1)………………………………………………….38 
      The success of the program…………………………………………………………………………………..41 






















   
  -5- 
Introduction 
In early 2020 an unprecedented shock ignited the world on a global level, the ripple 
effect of the Covid – 191 (the pandemic crisis), an unknown until then, literally lethal 
pandemic, that would quickly take on intractable social and economic dimensions. The 
pandemic has led to the depletion of global healthcare systems and even changed the 
perception of the human way of life.  Contingency measures were the solution 
introduced by the governments around the world in the effort to counter the problem 
and prevent further spread of the virus, namely quarantine, travel restrictions and even 
border shutdowns, which inadvertently resulted in the disruption of the real economy 
and as a corollary also affected the financial industry.2  
The lack of a suppressive medical treatment for the disease has activated a lot of 
concerns regarding a potential looming economic crisis and recession. A considerable 
worldwide gross domestic product (GDP) contraction is predicted and therefore, at the 
end of 2020, the uncertainty remains.3   
Once again, the European Banking Sector is facing a tremendous challenge and struggles 
to maintain the economy afloat, given the fact that in the Single Market, the financial 
system has a more bank market – based rather than a capital market – based structure.  
 
1 The coronavirus disease of 2019, named COVID-19 by the World Health Organisation (WHO), is caused 
by the “Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome coronavirus-2” (SARS-CoV-2) online at 
<https://www.who.int/emergencies/diseases/novel-coronavirus-2019/technical-guidance/naming-the-
coronavirus-disease-(covid-2019)-and-the-virus-that-causes-it > accessed 9 November 2020. 
 
2 Maria Nicola, Zaid Alsafi, Catrin Sohrabi, Ahmed Kerwan, Ahmed Al- Jabir, Christos Iosifidis, Maliha Agha 
and Riaz Agha, The socio-economic implications of the coronavirus pandemic (COVID-19): A review,2020, 
volume 78, International Journal of Surgery, 185-193, online at                                                             
<https://reader.elsevier.com/reader/sd/pii/S1743919120303162?token=E776983102A285792E2AFC41
B1854021FAD01A9E6A957ABC81E129C9ABE871914E0A70BACD3AED77D6982B32579AAC7A> accessed 
9 November 2020. 
 
3 THE EU BANKING SECTOR: FIRST INSIGHTS INTO THE COVID-19 IMPACTS (THEMATIC NOTE 




19%20on%20EU%20banks%20%E2%80%93%20May%202020.pdf > accessed 9 November 2020. 
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The peculiarity of the event is based on the fact that the problem does not stem from 
banking failure, as it was the case with the Global Financial Crisis (GFC), but from a total 
extrinsic factor, which could have never been predicted. 
Fortunately, at the point the pandemic crisis occurred, European Banks were found in a 
better position than that of 2007. Given the momentum of GFC the banking sector has 
come to develop a set of strong tools to weather   a potential storm, which currently   
have been transformed into useable frameworks, to wit their capital and liquidity ratios 
that mark higher in comparison with those of the previous crisis.  
Nevertheless, there are still some vulnerable aspects in the banking field, even after the 
previous crisis and the regulatory reforms. Low interest margins and excess capacity   in 
the sector resulted in low profitability, with a considerable number of banks still not 
being able to counterbalance their cost of equity.4 
Amidst this economic distress regulators and supervisors had an immediate response 
providing to banks certain flexibilities, aiming at balancing the situation, at least for the 
time being, by keeping them able to continue their operations. Among others, the 
European Banking Authority (EBA) put off the 2020 stress tests5 and the European 
Central Bank (ECB) allowed them to use entirely the capital and liquidity buffers, taking 
in as well Pillar 2 Guidance and also provided them relief regarding the formation of 
capital (Pillar 2 requirements). 6  
The landing point of the unprecedented vortex we are currently experiencing is difficult 
to be predicted, yet significant repercussions on bank balance sheets seems to be an 
inevitable scenario. Despite major improvements that have taken place in the aftermath 
 
4 THE EU BANKING SECTOR: FIRST INSIGHTS INTO THE COVID-19 IMPACTS (THEMATIC NOTE 




19%20on%20EU%20banks%20%E2%80%93%20May%202020.pdf > accessed 9 November 2020. 
 
 
5 EBA statement on actions to mitigate the impact of COVID -19 on the EU banking sector, EBA , 2020, 
online at < https://www.eba.europa.eu/eba-statement-actions-mitigate-impact-covid-19-eu-banking-
sector > accessed 9 November 2020. 
 
6 ECB Banking Supervision provides temporary capital and operational relied in reaction to coronavirus, 
2020, Press Release online at  < ECB Banking Supervision provides temporary capital and operational relief 
in reaction to coronavirus (europa.eu) >  accessed 9 November 2020. 
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of the recent financial crisis, structural deficiencies and weaknesses still exist in the 
European banking system. European Union and Eurozone need a safe and sound 
banking environment able to guarantee financial growth and stability, even in turbulent 
occasions.  In this context, taking under consideration the lessons learned from the past 
crisis, which was the trigger for more convergence and uniformity, European Banks have 
the ability to transform this downturn into an opportunity for structural changes in order 
not only to confront the current situation but also set a solid foundation to address, if 
need be, future challenges in a better and more enhanced shape.  
In the quest for a solution a specific argument stands out, according to which an 
effective resort to this end could be further consolidation (M&As) of the European 
Banking Sector. It could establish an effectual channel in the effort to upgrade their 
profitability, by pursuing economies of scale, resulting in becoming more cost – 
effective, and pursue faster digitalization by laying out money on technological 
innovation, a major prerequisite to encounter competition in current days. In addition 
to this, it could also be the answer to the long – lasting problem of incapacitated banks, 
which withhold the overall efficiency of the banking system, by providing them a smooth 
exit from the market.7 Moreover, it should also be noted that diversification and private 
risk sharing could be decisive stimulus for the materialization of cross-border 
consolidation, a type of business combination able to provide deepening integration in 
the Single Market and therefore facilitate the ongoing process for the completion of the 
European Banking Union. 
The attention of the supervisory authority in Eurozone seems to be captured by this 
idea. Notwithstanding that the final determinant decisions rest upon bank management 
teams and market participants, the European Central Bank, on 1st July 2020, launched a 
draft Guide for consultation (the public consultation was ended on 1st October 2020 and 
the Final Guide was published on 12 January 2021), regarding Consolidation, aiming at 
making clear and predictable their supervisory approach. 8  
 
7 Edouard Fernandez-Bollo, ECB representative to the Supervisory Board, Consolidation can secure safe 
and sound banks, 2020, ECB Supervision Newsletter, Interview,  online at < “Consolidation can secure safe 
and sound banks” (europa.eu) > accessed 9 November 2020.  
 
8 Edouard Fernandez – Bollo Member of the Supervisory Board of the ECB, Clarifying the ECB’s supervisory 
approach to consolidation, 2020 , ECB online at < Clarifying the ECB’s supervisory approach to 
consolidation (europa.eu)  > accessed 9 November 2020. 
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This dissertation aims at shedding some light as to whether further Consolidation in the 
European Banking Sector could be a feasible and effective solution to address the impact 
of the pandemic crisis and potential future challenges.   
In the first chapter the importance of the European Banking Union is highlighted, with a 
reference to the rationale behind it, its three pillars and the role of the European Central 
Bank. The second chapter comprises the existing vulnerabilities of the European Banking 
Sector, the drivers for consolidation (M&As) both domestic and cross-border and 
potential obstacles to cross-border consolidation. In this context the impact of European 
Banking integration on sustainable economic growth is also underlined. The third 
chapter provides empirical evidence in relation to domestic consolidation via the 
successful   paradigm of Spanish Savings Banks during 2009-2010. In the fourth chapter 
a comparison between the European Banking System and the USA Banking System is 
made, focused on the USA   deregulation as regards cross-border consolidation. The last 
chapter provides an evaluation and concludes.  
 
1.European Banking Union (EBU): an evolutionary project 
The establishment of the European Banking Union (EBU) constitutes a milestone in the 
evolution of the European banking amalgamation.   
1.1 The Rationale behind the creation of EBU 
In 2012, the President of the European Council in cooperation with the Presidents of the 
European Commission, the European Central Bank (ECB) and the Eurogroup, set up a 
specific, time – oriented plan in order to achieve an authentic European Monetary Union 
(EMU), an initiative resulted in a more centralized economic governance of the Member 
States. A crucial part of this project was the creation of EBU.9 Essentially it functions as 
a significant supplement both to Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) and the internal 
market, by providing an alignment concerning the accountability regime for supervision, 
resolution and also funding at an EU layer while all the banks, within the eurozone, are 
 
9 Christos V Gortsos, A brief overview of the European Banking Union, 2017, volume 383-384, no 2-3, L’ 
Europe en formation, online at < https://doi.org/10.3917/eufor.383.0061> accessed 9 November 2020. 
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obligated to comply with this regulation.10 From a geographical perspective it can also 
be extended to the non-euro area Member States, by providing them the ability to join, 
under a specific procedure, referred to as close cooperation.11 
In the effort to detect the motivation that resulted in this event, we find the intensified 
sovereign debt crisis in the euro area during 2012, that occurred after the GFC, which 
had revealed and evidenced the interconnection between banks’ and states’ solvency. 
It was more than obvious that despite the adoption of a common currency there was a 
lack of commonality features regarding the fiscal discipline. To be more specific, a 
forceful nexus had been created between nations and their banking system that 
produced the so-called vicious circle or else the sovereign-bank loop, which could be 
encountered in two forms.  When banks had a lot of governmental bonds on their 
balance sheet, a potential impairment in their state creditworthiness would induce 
solvency issues to themselves. On the other hand, a deterioration of a state’s banking 
system could negatively affect the governmental budget, due to a possible bank bailout 
financed by the state. Consequently, a pivotal link would be created between sovereign 
crisis and bank crisis. The contrition of this linkage had to be managed.12  
The ultimate intention was the denationalization of banks, namely the value of their 
balance sheets should be conditional only to the confidence and correctness of the 
institutions themselves, without counting on a potential state patronage if a problem 
occurred.13 
Therefore, breaking up the doom-loop, required three components to be introduced, to 
wit, a single supervisor along with a common set of standards applicable to all the banks 
 
10 European Parliament, Fact Sheets on the European Union, Banking Union online at     
<https://www.europarl.europa.eu/factsheets/en/sheet/88/banking-union > accessed 9 November 2020. 
11 Close cooperation with the ECB:  an entryway to banking union, 2018, ECB online at 
<https://www.bankingsupervision.europa.eu/press/publications/newsletter/2018/html/ssm.nl181114_
1.en.html > accessed 9 November 2020. 
12 Robert Godby, Stephanie B.  Anderson, Greek Tragedy, European Odyssey: The Politics and Economics 
of the Eurozone Crisis, Barbara Budrich Publishers, 2016, 63-65; Dirk Schoenmaker, The Banking Union: 
An open view and other issues, The Palgrave Handbook of European Banking, Thorsten Beck – Barbara 
Casu Editors, 2016, 452. 
 
13 EURO YEARBOOK 2018 Completing Monetary Union to forge a different world, Published by Fernando 
Fernadez Mendez de Andes, IE Business School, 225, online at Google Scholar  
<https://www.bruegel.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/EURO-YEARBOOK-2018.pdf> accessed 9 
November 2020.  
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across EU, a well determined resolution procedure in a case of illiquidity or insolvency 
issues and a deposit protection scheme that would cover all deposits.14 
Notwithstanding the prevailed tenet that the triggering momentum for the creation of 
EBU was the intensified sovereign debt crisis, there was also another parameter. The 
long – term reason was the management of cross border banking, given the fact that 
before the crisis of 2007, the portion of assets of national banks from other EU states 
was uprising and therefore, many academics had already stressed, the necessity for 
European banking supervision and resolution.15 According to Schoenmaker’s  financial 
trilemma cross border banking, financial stability and national policy on supervision and 
resolution are not compatible, due to the tendency of  national authorities to promote 
national interests, so the latter  had to retreat and the solution was given by the EBU on 
a supranational level.16 
1.2 The three pillars  
The dominant goal of EBU is to enhance financial stability in EU as a whole, minimize the 
market segmentation by providing a harmonized set of rules, avoid conditions under 
which the taxpayers’ money is used to tackle a banking failure and secure that banks are 
lusty and therefore able to confront a potential financial crisis.17 
It consists of three key components the Single Rulebook, the Single Supervisory 
Mechanism (SSM) and the Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM). 
The Sigle Rulebook18 sets the regulatory framework which applies to all the financial 
institutions and products across EU in order to avoid deformity of the internal market 
 
14 Robert Godby, Stephanie B.  Anderson, Greek Tragedy, European Odyssey: The Politics and Economics 
of the Eurozone Crisis, Barbara Budrich Publishers, 2016, 195. 
 
15 Dirk Schoenmaker, The Banking Union: An open view and other issues, The Palgrave Handbook of 
European Banking, Thorsten Beck – Barbara Casu Editors, 2016, 453-461 
 
16 Dirk Schoenmaker Duisenberg School of Finance, Amsterdam, The Netherlands, The financial trilemma, 
2011, Volume 111, issue 1, Economics Letters, 57-59 online journal at:  
<https://reader.elsevier.com/reader/sd/pii/S0165176511000115?token=42238BA754507B9A544CDC31
91ED1D412F451E9B83DB2046BCA015C429825ADABB2B051B909527E0D5B2F35D1A182F32 > accessed 
9 November 2020.  
 
17 European Council, Banking Union online at < https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/banking-
union/ > accessed 9 December 2020. 
18European Council, Banking Union online at < https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/banking-
union/ > , Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 of 15 October 2013 conferring specific tasks on the 
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and includes the Capital Requirements Regulation (CRR), the Capital Requirements 
Directive IV (CRD IV), the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD) and the 
Deposit Guarantee Schemes Directive.19 
 
The SSM (the first pillar) represents the banking supervision system in the Eurozone and 
consists of the ECB and the national supervisory authorities of the engaged Member 
States. Its mission is to secure a safe and sound European banking system, a consequent 
supervision and pursue further financial integration and stability.20 A number of tasks 
concerning prudential supervision are conferred to the ECB by the SSM regulation 
(SSMR).21 It is also accorded the responsibility of direct supervision of the significant 
banks, which cover almost 85% of banking assets in the eurozone, and indirect 
supervision of the less systematically important ones. The kernel of the SSM is the 
European Central Bank (ECB) which operates through the Single Supervisory Board 
(SSB), responsible for the supervision of the largest cross border banks in eurozone and 
the top three by magnitude of each Member State that participates. The SSM is also 
conferred the responsibility to oversee the national competent authorities regarding 
direct supervision on small and medium sized credit institutions.22 
 
European Central Bank concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions, 
Recital 11, online at < https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32013R1024 > 
accessed 9 December 2020. 
 
19Directive 2014/49/EU of 16 April 2014 on deposit guarantee schemes online at < https://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32014L0049 > accessed 9 December 2020. 
 
20 European Central Bank, Single Supervisory Mechanism, online at   < 
https://www.bankingsupervision.europa.eu/about/thessm/html/index.en.html#:~:text=The%20Single%
20Supervisory%20Mechanism%20%28SSM%29%20refers%20to%20the,the%20national%20supervisory
%20authorities%20of%20the%20participating%20countries. > accessed 9 December 2020. 
21 Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 of 15 October 2013 conferring specific tasks on the European 
Central Bank concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institution,  Regulation 
(EU) No 1093/2010 of The European Parliament and of the Council of 24 November 2010 establishing a 
European Supervisory Authority (European Banking Authority), amending Decision No 716/2009/EC and 
repealing Commission Decision 2009/78/EC accessed 9 December 2020. 
22 Alexander Kern, European Banking Union: A Legal and Institutional Analysis of the Single Supervisory 
Mechanism and the Single Resolution Mechanism, 2015, European Law Review, 40 (2), 164-165 online 
<https://www.researchgate.net/publication/289816692_European_Banking_Union_A_Legal_and_Instit
utional_Analysis_of_the_Single_Supervisory_Mechanism_and_the_Single_Resolution_Mechanism, > 
accessed 9 December 2020. 
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It has a strong connection with the Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM) and the Single 
Resolution Fund (SRF). In the event of a bank failure the SRM, which is the second pillar 
of EBU, has specific tools to provide an effective bank resolution through a Single 
Resolution Board and a Single Resolution Fund, financed by the banking sector itself. 
The aim of the SRM is to make sure that an orderly bank resolution will take place, not 
at the expense of taxpayers and real economy.  23 
The significance of EBU, is unquestionable, it has been a major step in the EU, but it is 
deemed to be incomplete, given the fact that the third pillar - the European  Deposit 
Insurance Scheme (EDIS), that will provide a safety net to protect depositors no matter 
where they are within the Eurozone- is still under negotiations and has not been realized 
yet, on the other hand the financing of the Single Resolution Fund (SRF), which is 
expected to achieve the goal of 1% of covered deposits in EBU until 2023 and also the 
creation of its backstop for the occasion that it does not afford adequate funds for a 
bank resolution, are still on process.24 However, even at this incomplete phase EBU 
demonstrates the advantages obtained when national governments take brave 
initiatives to convoy part of their authority on a supranational level. 
1.3 The role and communication impact of ECB 
During the years ECB has established itself as a top European institution with significant 
influence not only over the EU area but also over the world economy. According to the 
list of the Financial Stability Board the majority of the global systematically important 
banks (G-SIBs), is found in Europe under its prudential supervision. 25 
 
23 European Commission Single Resolution Mechanism, online at <https://ec.europa.eu/info/business-
economy-euro/banking-and-finance/banking-union/single-resolution-mechanism_en> accessed 9 
December 2020; European Capital Markets, Second Edition , Editor Rudiger Veil , Oxford and Portland 
Oregon, 2017, Chapter 11, par.63. 
 
24 What is the Single Resolution Fund? Single Resolution Board (SRB), online at 
<https://srb.europa.eu/en/content/single-resolution-fund >  ; Timo Lottyniemi, SRB Vice Chair, The 
Common Backstop : how it will strengthen  the Single Resolution Fund, 2018, online at 
<https://srb.europa.eu/en/node/664#:~:text=For%20credibility%2C%20the%20existence%20of%20a%2
0Backstop%20to,or%20those%20financial%20means%20are%20not%20readily%20available.>  accessed 
12 December 2020. 
 
25 FSB (Financial Stability Board), 2019 list of global systematically important banks, online at 
<https://www.fsb.org/2019/11/2019-list-of-global-systemically-important-banks-g-sibs/ > accessed 9 
November 2020. 
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When it comes to consolidation (M&As) the ECB will evaluate the project from a viability 
and sustainability perspective so as to make sure that the newly combined entity will be 
in a position to abide by all the prudential requirements in the future. Mergers are 
subject to domestic law and therefore if the respective country is granting power to 
national supervision, the ECB will be involved, as far as significant banks under direct 
supervision by it, are concerned. In a case where the national supervisor is not granted 
power to provide approval, the ECB will be engaged in the procedure in the context of 
the regular supervision of the participating institutions.   As regards acquisitions, every 
acquisition that involves participation 10% or more of the shares and/or the voting rights 
or meets other thresholds, is subject to ECB approval. The review of the acquisition takes 
place by the national supervisor in cooperation with ECB, under the criteria set in the 
Capital Requirements Directive.26 
 
The aforementioned responsibilities make comprehensible enough that ECB plays a 
crucial role when it comes to Mergers and Acquisitions in the banking sector. Therefore, 
it was of a great importance the launching of a draft Guide for consultation27 (which 
was later finalized on 12 January 2021), on 1st July 2020, regarding Consolidation28, 
aiming at making clear and predictable the supervisory approach. A twofold 
interpretation applies to this event. The intention to clarify in advance the form of 
evaluation that will be put on practice, regarding potential mergers and acquisitions in 
the market, so that the participants involved will be able to put forward a permissible 
and sustainable plan29 but most important it is a minor step equivalent to a decisive 
 
26 What is the ECB’s role in bank mergers and acquisitions? ECB online at  
<https://www.bankingsupervision.europa.eu/about/ssmexplained/html/bank_mergers_acquisitions.en.
html > accessed 9 December 2020. 
 
27 1st October 2020 was the end of public consultation and the ECB published the finalised Guide on 12 
January 2021 online at 
<https://www.bankingsupervision.europa.eu/press/pr/date/2021/html/ssm.pr210112~920b511a1c.en.
html > accessed 27 January 2021 ; ECB, Draft ECB Guide on the supervisory approach to consolidation in 
the banking sector, 2020 online at 
<https://www.bankingsupervision.europa.eu/legalframework/publiccons/pdf/consolidation/ssm.guidec
onsolidation_draft.en.pdf > accessed 9  December 2020. 
 
28 The Guide only covers mergers and acquisitions. 
 
29 Edouard Fernandez – Bollo, Member of the Supervisory Board of the ECB, ECB,  Clarifying  the ECB’s 
supervisory approach to consolidation,2020, online at 
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sign that the time has come for banks to perform structural changes to their business 
models.  Both intentions aim at appeasing the concerns of the market focused on 
specific key areas, deemed to have been impediments to participants considering a 
merger or an acquisition in the past. Specifically, the guide highlights the capital 
requirements issue, the treatment of bad will (the profit that occurs from the 
acquisition of assets at a lower price compared to their fair value) and the internal 
models aspect. As regards banks with high capital requirements, the starting point of 
capital for the new entity  will be the weighted average of the parties’ Pillar 2 
requirements and Pillar 2 guidance before they merged,  additionally the supervisor has 
the expectation that the potential acquirer will use the profit of bad will in order to 
enhance sustainability of the newly combined bank, thus pursue for example risk 
reduction or investments instead of using it  as means for dividends and  finally the ECB 
provides the possibility of using the existing internal models on a temporary basis under 
various conditions. Three phases are underlined throughout the guide, the early 
communication related to an early discussion with the supervisor, before any public 
disclosure. The parties provide full details on the proposed project so that the 
supervisor will be able to deliver a complete feedback and also inform them whether 
an approval is required or not. The next stage is the application phase. A submission of 
a formal application by the parties takes place, which will be assessed by the supervisor. 
If a positive decision is made the implementation phase follows. It includes monitoring 
and close supervision of the ongoing project compliant with all the prudential 
requirements. The guide also covers Less Significant Institutions (LSIs) taking under 
consideration the competent authority of both the ECB and the NCAs.30  
From my standpoint, it seems that the prudent supervisor considers the banking 
consolidation issue as a key element in the effort to obtain profitability, sustainability 




html > accessed 9 December 2020. 
 
30 Guide on the supervisory approach to consolidation in the banking sector, ECB , 2021 online at 
https://www.bankingsupervision.europa.eu/ecb/pub/pdf/ssm.guideconsolidation2101~fb6f871dc2.en.p
df accessed 27 January 2021. 
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that could be the means to reach the ultimate goal to serve the economy, especially in 
current times in the context of the pandemic crisis. 
The impact of this initiative in the market remains to be seen but it should be noted that 
according to studies the communication of ECB gains attention and under specific 
circumstances increases the efficacy of its policy, given the fact that in general, 
communication functions as a significant means of a central bank in order to attain more 
credibility and transparency.31 
 
 
2. Vulnerabilities of the Banking sector and Drivers for Consolidation  
The European Banking sector is still susceptible to economic distress, due to existing 
vulnerabilities, despite the regulatory progress that has already taken place in the 
aftermath of GFC and the sovereign debt crisis, conversely, the same vulnerabilities can 
also display an incentive for further Consolidation.  
2.1 Existing vulnerabilities 
Regulatory reformation that has taken place in recent years enabled banks to meet the 
current unprecedented vortex with sufficient capital and liquidity buffers, able to absorb 
potential losses. Given the momentum of GFC the banking sector has come to develop 
a set of strong tools to weather   a potential storm, which currently   have been 
transformed into useable frameworks, to wit their capital and liquidity ratios that mark 
higher in comparison with those of the previous crisis.  
Ιn Q4 2019 the Common Equity Tier 1 (CET1) ratio was almost 15%   instead of 9% in 
2009, which means it was far above the regulatory requirements set. Similarly, the total 
Liquidity Coverage Ratios (LCRs) almost reached   150% in Q1 2020. Capital and liquidity 
 
31 Goethe University (Research), Study at Goethe University shows: ECB communication strongly affects 
financial markets, 2019, online at <https://www.wiwi.uni-frankfurt.de/en/research/research-
news/details/article/study-how-the-ecbs-word-choice-influences-the-financial-market.html > , Michael J. 
Lamla , Sarah M. Lein, What maters when? The impact of ECB communication on financial market 
expectations, 2011, Volume 43, Applied Economics, 4289, online at  < 
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/00036846.2010.491452?casa_token=E8scC68Pze0AAA
AA:vylhO5V6DeJDMnSZW6JCPQY5hGmTKsQ2vpzGo5FN1OM4bweBGKUAN7fdBkJQxF1jTJcJS_px0ZX49Q 
>   accessed 9 December 2020. 
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buffers are of great importance because of their function as means for the banks to 
address stress and provide support to the real economy, not only now but also in the 
future when, hopefully the pandemic is successfully restrained, and economy proceeds 
in recovery.32 
Nevertheless, there are still some vulnerable aspects in the banking field, even after the 
previous crisis. Low interest margins and excess capacity   in the sector resulted in low 
profitability, with a considerable number of banks still not being able to counterbalance 
their cost of equity.  In addition to this, NPL ratio remains at a higher level compared to 
pre – GFC ones, albeit the asset quality improvement that has taken place, with the 
contraction of NPL ratio to 3.1% instead of 7.1% in 2014.33 
NPLs will constitute an imminent challenge in the effort to achieve economic recovery 
after the pandemic crisis, due   to the fact that according to empirical evidence, after 
economic shocks, the number of non – performing loans increases substantially,34 
resulting in asset quality deterioration. Consequently, this could cause a declining 
impact on interest income. 
The display of upraised cost - to income ratios in respect of tenacious poor performance 
resulted in low aggregation of bank profitability, which has attenuated the resilience of 
the banking sector. The cost inefficiency issues are more intense for the smallest and 
largest banks.  
 
32 THE EU BANKING SECTOR: FIRST INSIGHTS INTO THE COVID-19 IMPACTS (THEMATIC NOTE 
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19%20on%20EU%20banks%20%E2%80%93%20May%202020.pdf  > accessed 9 November 2020. 
 
 
34Anil Ari, Sophia Chen and Lev Ratnovski,  COVID-19 and non-performing loans: lessons from past crises, 
2020, Research Bulletin No71, ECB online at  <  COVID-19 and non-performing loans: lessons from past 
crises (europa.eu)   >    accessed 9 November 2020. 
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Retained earnings are deemed to be the best way to manage an absorption of losses 
and develop a capital position but since mid – 2012, the subdued profitability of banks 
has been classified as a factor of risk to eurozone financial stability. According to ECB 
analysis in 201835, cyclical limitations such as large shares of legacy assets, have played 
a crucial role along with low interest rates. However, structural concerns of 
overcapacity, competition, lack of diversification and weak cost – efficiency cannot be 
disregarded. A banking system functioning under serious excess capacity, could be 
subject to ailing practices of competition, having gambling for resurrection competitors, 
undercutting the margins for sound participants. In addition to this, in a case of harsh 
competition, banks not being able to meet their fixed costs needs, could be left behind 
regarding technological innovation, digitalization or restructuring of their business 
models.36 
The overbanking issue is not possible to be clearly defined. According to ex Chair of the 
Supervisory Board of the ECB Daniele Nouy   the term could cover “too many banks or 
too many weak banks” with subdued profitability as well, which do not get out of the 
market. In this case it is more likely that these entities will get involved in risky activities 
in order to build up capital, ending up deteriorating financial stability.37 
Moreover, regarding the concept that profitability is   considered to be closely linked to 
factors that produce overbanking and extreme risk taking in Europe, the ESRB’s Advisory 
Scientific Committee (2014) report38, indicated three elements which are highlighted for 
European overbanking, to wit, insufficient prudential supervision in conjunction with 
 
35 Magnus Andersson, Christoffer Kok, Harun Mirza,  Csaba More and Jonas Mosthaf, How can euro area 
banks reach sustainable  profitability in the future? Financial Stability Review 2018, ECB online at 
<https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/financial-stability/fsr/special/html/ecb.fsrart201811_1.en.html > 
accessed 9 November 2020. 
36 Desislava Andreeva, Maciej Grodzicki, Csada More and Alessio Reghezza, Euro area bank profitability: 
where can consolidation help?, 2019, Financial Stability Review, ECB, online at  < 
https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/financial-
stability/fsr/special/html/ecb.fsrart201911_01~81377050be.en.html  > accessed 9 December 2020. 
 
37 Daniel Nouy Chair of the Supervisory Board of the ECB at the VIII Financial Forum, Too much of a good 
thing? The need of Consolidation in the European Banking Sector, (2017), ECB online at < 
https://www.bankingsupervision.europa.eu/press/speeches/date/2017/html/ssm.sp170927.en.html > 
accessed 11 December 2020. 
 
38 Reports of the Advisory Scientific Committee, Is Europe Overbanked? 2014, ESRB, 35-40 online at 
<https://www.esrb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/asc/Reports_ASC_4_1406.pdf > accessed 11 December 2020. 
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public patronage, political encouragement to banks resulting in over expanding and 
technological developments along with elevated competition in the banking field.39 
Weak profitability perspectives also led to the decline of EU banks’ valuation. When 
stock markets arrived at the peak of the year (YtD), on 19 February 2020, EU banks 
reached a price to book ratio (PtB) at 0.74, whereas valuation of USA banks marked 
higher near 1.33.40 
Overall, regarding underperformance three types of banks can be identified: 
a) the bearers of legacy assets on the grounds of a high percentage of non – 
performing loans, with an average NPL ratio over 20% during the period 2015 – 
2018. In this case elevated costs to handle trouble assets lead in also elevated cost 
to income ratios. It is no surprise that most of these banks are found in countries 
that had been more influenced by the eurozone debt crisis (Greece, Italy, Cyprus). 
b) the institutions with poor profitability, due to lack of capacity to generate income 
which, as a    consequence, retain a low income - to assets ratio, while the cost to 
income ratio remains high. In this group German banks prevail, likely because of a 
high level of competitive prices in this market. 
c) finally, in the third type a more heterogeneous group is found, with multiple sources 
of subdued profitability, focused on cost /income problems or a high percentage of 
NPLs.41 
 
39 Tatiana Farina, Jan Pieter Krahner,  Loriana Pelizzon,  Mark Wahrenburg, What are the main factors for 
the subdued profitability of significant banks in the Banking Union, and is the ECB's supervisory response 
conclusive and exhaustive? A critical assessment of the 2018 SSM report on bank profitability and business 
models, 2019, SAFE White Paper, No. 65, ISBN 978-92-846-6076-6, Leibniz Institute for Financial Research 
SAFE, Frankfurt a. M., 14,  online at <http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:hebis:30:3-530565 > accessed 9 
December 2020. 
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  -19- 
In respect with common cost very small banks and banks with total assets more than 
€30 billion demonstrate a strong cost inefficiency. Despite   the fact that during 2016 -
2018 there was an improvement, the problem remains. As regards the issue of 
overcapacity, it is evidenced by an excessive number of competitors and an excessive 
physical infrastructure. Apart from that, loan – deposit margin has been declining in 
recent years, which suggests that the pricing power of banks is narrow, with only 
exception the case of large institutions. 
It is noteworthy, that empirical analysis suggests that very weak and small banks with 
limited performance, not being   able to operate on an optimal scale and without an 
opportunity to change their business model could be subject to domestic consolidation, 
without   the danger to create oligopolies or too-big-to-fail (TBTF) problems, while at 
the same time they could contribute to financial stability and enhance the resilience of 
the banking sector.  
As regards the largest banks with poor performance, domestic consolidation would 
probably raise a problem, from   a market power and competition perspective. In this 
case a cross – border option could be the most suitable solution. 42 
We should also take under consideration that in the context of the unfolding pandemic 
crisis further potential vulnerabilities may occur. Decisive fiscal monetary and 
prudential measures that have managed to keep the economy afloat so far and the 
banking sector able to operate and provide its essential services cannot generate any 
profits for banks and therefore are not able to prevent a decline on banks profitability, 
in the absence of an offset against the forthcoming shortages (ie defaulting borrowers) 
thereby, capital erosion may jeopardize their viability.43 
 
 
42Desislava Andreeva, Maciej Grodzicki, Csada More and Alessio Reghezza, Euro area bank profitability: 
where can consolidation help?,  Financial Stability Review, ECB, November 2019, online at < 
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2.2 Drivers for Consolidation 
Following the establishment of the single currency in 1999 and the elimination of legal 
obstacles to European Banking integration via a single passport right, a speed up of 
financial integration in the euro area occurred, partly comprised of a growing number 
of cross-border M&As. 
Since 2007 the aggregate M&A banking activity in the euro area has been decreased in 
connection with numbers and valuation of dealings. Most impressive the valuation of 
2016 which has been the lowest since 2000. The domestic M&As had persistently 
overshadowed the cross – border ones but, when the 2007 crisis emerged, they also 
declined.44 The acquisition of the Belgian and Luxembourg segments of Fortis by BNP 
Paribas (French bank) and the takeover of some Lehman Brothers segments by Barclays, 
were among the limited cases of cross-border consolidation during the respective 
period.45 However, there was a slight exception in 2010 and 2013 involving domestic 
M&As in Germany, Italy and countries under programs of EU or IMF. In addition, despite 
the creation of EBU and the establishment of the   SSM, cross border M&As were only 
the 9% of the total dealings in 2016, instead of 15% during the period 2000-2015.46 
According to literature review the ultimate goal behind banking consolidation is the 
increase of shareholder value, which is achieved through the channels of market power, 
economies of scale or scope, efficient management and favorable tax treatment. In a 
case of a concentrating market, market power will probably give the ability to the 
respective entity to charge higher fees or interest rates when it comes to retail or 
lending. 
 
44Financial integration in Europe, ECB, 2017, 42-43, online at < 
https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/other/ecb.financialintegrationineurope201705.en.pdf > accessed 
10 December 2020.   
45 Dirk Schoenmaker, Rotterdam School of Management, Erasmus University; Erasmus Research Institute 
of Management (ERIM); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR), The New Banking Union Landscape 
in Europe: Consolidation ahead?2015,  Duisenberg School of Finance Policy Paper No49, 9, SSRN, online 
at < https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2509147 > accessed 15 December 2020. 
 
46 Financial integration in Europe, ECB, 2017, 42-44, online at < 
https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/other/ecb.financialintegrationineurope201705.en.pdf > accessed 
10 December 2020.   
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Reduction of average costs or increase of earnings, depending on the entity’s size, given 
the dispersion of fixed costs on a larger base or risk diversity, is the characteristic of 
economies of scale, whereas, in the event of extra ongoing activities based on co 
operations or risk diversification we encounter economies of scope. An M&A deal can 
also elevate the firm’s value, by offsetting the acquirer’s profits with the losses of the 
target.47 
Domestic mergers are deemed to be the best option for cost savings via economies of 
scale. Before the GFC a wave of domestic bank mergers materialized   across EU resulting 
in a concentrated banking market between 1999-2007. When the       financial crisis 
started off there was a sudden contraction of merger activity. In the aftermath of the 
crisis the trend remained. Simultaneously the banking system had a more   digital 
orientation, focusing on technology and internet payments. Consequently, through the 
period 2010 -2017 almost all EU States had a serious reduction in numbers of branches 
and employees, instead of domestic merger the new trend now was the merging of local 
branches.48 
Moreover, domestic consolidation can be a useful tool to deal with excess capacity 
issues. A smaller number of banks with stronger balance sheets and better profitability, 
can contribute to a more resilient banking sector. 
Currently, potential markets to be involved in domestic mergers, could be those that 
bear the burden of overcapacity, poor profitability, low perspective of development, 
legacy issues (NPLs) and cost efficiency problems, such as Germany and Italy. In these 
countries the five largest banks   hold a 32.1% and 47.9% correspondingly of total 
assets.49 
 
47 Anna  Gardella, Massimiliano Rimarchi , Davide Stroppa, Potential regulatory obstacles to cross-border 
merger and acquisitions in the EU Banking Sector, EBA, 2020, 6, online at < 
https://eba.europa.eu/sites/default/documents/files/document_library/844126/Potential%20obstacles
%20M%26A.pdf > accessed 10 December 2020. 
48 Patty   Duijm, Dirk Schoenmaker and Bruegel, European Bank Mergers: domestic or cross Border?   2018, 
online at < https://www.bruegel.org/2018/06/european-bank-mergers-domestic-or-cross-border/ > 
accessed 10 December 2020. 
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Cross – border mergers, on the other hand, are considered appropriate to obtain risk 
diversification, albeit they do not provide higher returns, they do contribute to the 
reduction of credit risk.50 According to studies an entity with banking operations in two 
countries after expanding its business into a third one has a reduction in default risk up 
to 1.3%.51 
Another feature of cross-border mergers is the escalation of technological novelty. 
Strong players such as ING Bank and Santander, after investing in new technology, they 
can use it for both domestic and international operations. When   Santander acquired 
Abbey National of UK and ING the German DIrektbank, the entities took the advantage 
through those acquisitions to demonstrate their technological   supremacy   to the 
respective markets and obtain higher returns via economies of scale.52  
2.2.1 A microeconomic analysis of M&As 
 
This section underlines the stability and efficiency effects of M&As – both domestic and 
cross-border, in connection with individual banks:   
 
A difference between cross-border and domestic M&A is that the former does not 
increase concentration or limit competition. When a foreign bank acquires a domestic 
one, the deal has no influence on the shares of the domestic market, on the contrary in 
a case of a domestic merger usually a concentration phenomenon occurs, but if the 
 
50 Patty   Duijm, Dirk Schoenmaker, European Banks straddling borders: Risky or rewarding?  2017, SSRN, 
10, online at < https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3000821 >accessed 10 December 
2020. 
 
51 Patty   Duijm, Dirk Schoenmaker and Bruegel, European Bank Mergers: domestic or cross Border?   2018, 
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foreign acquirer demonstrates the same competitiveness as the target the local or 
national competition will not be affected. 
Another aspect is the potential changes in banking services pricing which could be 
reflected on loan and deposit rates, credit accessibility of SMEs and even payment of 
retail depositors. In this context we need to take under consideration two models, 
namely the SCP (structure-conduct-performance) paradigm and the efficient -structure 
one.53  According to SCP theory54 the structure of the market itself has an impact on the 
entity’s conduct which in the long run will affect its final performance, thereby, when it 
comes to elevated concentration, banks have the ability to inflict higher pricing on their 
market rivals, resulting in higher earnings caused by an increase of lending rates, 
decrease of deposit rates but all this at the expense of consumers. On the contrary, as 
far as the second model is concerned, elevated concentration in the market would 
highlight the advanced productiveness of some banks related with lower lending rates 
resulting in better gains but at the same time with more benefits for consumers. M&As 
final positive or negative impact on the efficiency aspect would be determined by the 
prevailed model in the market.55 
Regarding the enhancement of bank performance through domestic mergers there is a 
divergence among empirical studies. Although USA cases dictate that efficiency gains 
scarcely   come to fruition, European ones confirm an essential improvement for a large 
part of them. On the contrary, there is a convergence that cross-border M&As have the 
ability to materialize more efficiency gains than domestic dealings based on the 
observation that typically bigger and more efficient banks acquire targets of 
 
53 Financial integration in Europe May 2017, ECB, chapter 2, 2.1, 48-50, online at < 
https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/other/ecb.financialintegrationineurope201705.en.pdf > accessed 
12 December 2020.   
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concentrated markets, which are slugging behind in terms of productiveness and 
profitability.56 
In addition, cross- border M&A deals can be a channel leading to the creation of more 
and strong pan- European Banks, effectively competitive at a global level, being able to 
confront their rivals at a parity level, through international allocation of their networks. 
Simultaneously they could facilitate   and reinforce the evolutionary process of 
European Capital markets, given the fact that a specific scale is an important 
prerequisite for capital market services.57 This would be a significant contribution to the 
completion of Capital Markets Union, a top priority for the European Commission, 
complementary to the EBU, which ultimately can lead to the finalization of EMU and 
therefore provide a further integration in the Single Market, as well as financial stability 
and resilience to the impact of economic cycles.58 
Moreover, in a case of a merger, the corporate vehicle of European Company (SE), could 
be an option for potential pan-European Banks, in the effort to pursue their 
multinational goals and reap all the benefits of a supranational European Law.59 Notably, 
on 21 December of 2020, the Baltic International Bank converted into Baltic 
International Bank SE, aiming at enhancing its international orientation and recognition 
both in EU and abroad.60 
 
56 Financial integration in Europe May 2017, ECB, chapter 2, 2.1, 50, online at < 
https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/other/ecb.financialintegrationineurope201705.en.pdf > accessed 
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In terms of stability, it should be highlighted that M&As in the banking sector, are subject 
not only to competition review but also to a supervisory one, which guarantees the 
soundness of the newly combined entity or entities. 61 
It is also noteworthy, that regarding the non-performing loans, a top priority in current 
times, cross-border consolidation could also mark a serious contribution. Assuming the   
banking consolidation would only concern small or medium sized frangible banks, then 
the result of such a consolidation would only be the creation of a larger entity but still 
frangible one. Nevertheless, if a strong bank acquired a fragile bank, frustrated with 
legacy assets, then NPL problems of the target would be solved.62 At the same time, the 
strong acquirer could reap all the benefits from the bad will management   based on 
the ECB’s Guide, which, in this case, is underlined as an attractive parameter. 
 As regards excess capacity issues in some countries probably a balanced combination 
of domestic and cross-border consolidation could be more effective, in avoiding risk 
threats against financial stability. In the event of a domestic consolidation local 
participants may build up their market power and therefore achieve better profitability 
but at the same time levels of competition may decline and also motivation to control 
their costs, whereas cross-border consolidation usually does not induce such risks. 
According to the charter value hypothesis banks with elevated profits avoid taking 
higher risk, because in a default situation they jeopardize losing more. That being said 
consolidation can contribute to a greater level of stability, if it is combined with high 
market power and thereby high profitability.63 
Consolidation in the banking sector can also affect the supervisory responsibilities. 
Although they can become further simplified in a case of a reduction in terms of 
numbers of banks, when generating bigger and more complex banks a more challenging 
 
61 Financial integration in Europe May 2017, ECB, chapter 2, 2.1, 51, online at < 
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evaluation of banking stability risks could be induced. In this respect regulatory reforms 
in the aftermath of the GFC and sovereign debt crisis provide a solid safety net, namely, 
the setting up of SSM in conjunction with the BRRD and SRM, which can limit the too-
big-to-fail concerns and guarantee an orderly resolution even for larger banks.64  
 
2.2.2 A macroeconomic analysis of cross-border M&As 
  
A significant stimulus for cross-border banking consolidation in EU, could be the private 
risk sharing, which from a macroeconomic perspective could also facilitate the 
functioning of EMU itself. Cross-border or even cross-regional credit is a major effectual 
private method of defense   against domestic financial shocks, especially retail banking   
has been confirmed as more resilient than interbank lending. Albeit the regime of a 
Banking Union, currently, cross-border retail credit does   not seem quite realistic or at 
least rarely occurs. In addition, new entry in foreign markets is restricted by multiple 
reasons such as lack of adequate information, language, legal or taxation impediments. 
Therefore, the only effective way to elevate this type of credit penetration, is through 
M&As.65  
 Risk diversification is an essential advantage provided by cross-border penetration, on 
the grounds that the respective entity avoids domestic shocks through the acquisition 
of a foreign bank. Having an extra fixed base depositor’s generator abroad, could be 
useful to address situations of domestic economic distress.66 Additionally, this 
diversification of sources would ensure that there would not be any danger or at least 
there would be a limited one, in a case of simultaneous exposure both to domestic and 
 
64 Financial integration in Europe May 2017, ECB, chapter 2, 2.1, 57, online at < 
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international shock events.67 From an asset side perspective it could contribute to lower 
asset volatility and consequently to lower lending volatility in the domestic area. This 
would likely result in having banks holding less domestic governmental bonds and a 
weakened sovereign-bank loop, since there would be no interdependence between the 
bank’s balance sheet and a potential impairment of state credibility.68 
Moreover, the expansion of banking activities abroad provides to banks the privilege to 
promote their lending specialism. The extra risk taken by penetrating to specific 
economic zones is distributed in the interbank market. In this case a potential contagion 
risk is mitigated when the profits for banks exceed the contagion cost. 
A crucial factor in order to reap all the benefits from risk sharing in the euro area 
through M&As, is to exclude a potential offset of stability risks. In this respect, given the 
fact that on a regional level, national supervisory authorities provide confidence as 
regards stability issues and do not raise any uncertainties concerning cross-regional 
mergers, respectively in the aftermath of substantial regulatory reforms that have 
taken place and more specifically, the establishment of SSM, the creation of pan-
European banks can be supported by a stringent macroprudential supervision by SSM.69 
 
2.2.3 Potential barriers to cross-border consolidation 
 
Despite the advantageous perspectives of cross-border consolidation and the creation 
of the European Banking Union which provided a single supervision for all the banks 
across the Eurozone, under a common set of rules, the performance of cross-border 
M&As remained subdued since 2007. On the other hand, in the context of national 
 
67 Mathias Hoffmann, University of Zurich, Professor and Chair of International Trade and Finance at the 
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banking systems, 83% of banks remains domestically owned. Obviously, barriers to the 
promotion of banking integration still exist related to business, regulatory and 
institutional factors.70 
Banking M&As entail the commitment of a serious amount of funds and therefore 
involve a certain degree of risk. As in any other industry, banking business has a cyclical 
orientation. M&As operation requires an environment of economic growth, during 
which banks explore potential opportunities to promote their interests and expect a 
positive output. Low profitability of the sector, in the context of an ongoing recovery 
with additional excess capacity and legacy problems, spurred banks to focus on re-
establishing their capital position and comply with the relevant regulatory 
requirements rather than aiming at M&A tactics. Moreover, even language and cultural 
differences can be liable for M&A failure in other industries. This could probably explain 
partly, in conjunction with other parameters, the fact that merger activity within single 
countries (ie USA), has been more intense than among EU ones.71It should be noted 
though that the USA had already entrenched a common deposit insurance before the 
cross-border banking markets were deregulated.  
The application of national laws as regards the legal and regulatory review basis may 
produce enhanced cross-border M&As costs, for the participated in SSM countries, 
because the potential profits of the deal should be bigger in order to pursue a well-
founded business project. Acquisitions are organized under national law, albeit highly 
harmonized, and the SSM is responsible to provide the final approval,72on the other 
 
70 EURO YEARBOOK 2018, Completing Monetary Union to forge a different world, Published by Fernando 
Fernandez Mendez de Andes, IE Business School, 10.3.1, 221, online at < https://www.bruegel.org/wp-
content/uploads/2019/06/EURO-YEARBOOK-2018.pdf > accessed 12 December 2020.  
71 Financial integration in Europe May 2017, ECB, chapter 2, 3.1, 60-61, online at < 
https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/other/ecb.financialintegrationineurope201705.en.pdf > accessed 
12 December 2020.    
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Pensions Authority (EIOPA) and ESMA, (JC/CP/2015/003), online at 
<https://register.eiopa.europa.eu/Publications/Consultations/JC%20CP%202015%20003%20(CP%20on
%20Joint%20Guidelines%20on%20Qualifying%20Holdings).pdf > 12 December 2020. 
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hand mergers are ruled by national law characterized by heterogeneity, which could be 
considered as a coefficient of discouragement for future participants.73 
In addition, an alignment in the taxation system of the banking sector would be crucial 
to eliminate the diversity across EU. Therefore, the European Commission’s proposal 
for a common consolidated corporate tax base (CCCTB) that has been relaunched, is a 
promising sign. This could significantly decrease the operational cost for a cross-border 
activity. Furthermore, political uncertainty also played its part, after the GFC emerged 
and   later again around 2016 with UK’s referendum.74 
However, the fact that the European Banking Union remains incomplete is a 
predominant factor, given that the regulatory banking framework is nationally 
fragmented. The deposit insurance is covered only at a national level. That being said 
national regulators could be quite reluctant against a possibility of their banks merging 
with foreign ones, because an economic shock abroad would probably activate their 
relevant schemes, at the expense of their taxpayers.75  In addition, despite the 
establishment of ESM, a useful toolkit to provide stabilization in a case of a large bank 
resolution or recapitalization, potential applicants of a relevant request would be 
sovereign states not banks.76 So, once again, the responsibility of a bank’s 
recapitalization lies on national governments.77 
 
73 Example: In Germany banking mergers do not require prior approval from the national competent 
authority (Art. 2 (2) Council Regulation (EU) No. 1024/2013) but in other countries this is a requirement 
(ie, in Belgium, Spain, Italy etc); Financial integration in Europe May 2017, ECB, chapter 2, 3.2, 62-63, 
online at < https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/other/ecb.financialintegrationineurope201705.en.pdf > 
accessed 12 December 2020  
  
74Financial integration in Europe May 2017, ECB, chapter 2, 3.2, 63-64, online at < 
https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/other/ecb.financialintegrationineurope201705.en.pdf > accessed 
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<https://www.suerf.org/policynotes/11761/making-banking-integration-work-for-better-risk-sharing-in-
the-eurozone-the-role-of-cross-border-banking-consolidation > accessed  12 December 2020. 
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therefore the use of the indirect recapitalization instrument is infeasible”, online at< 
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Another crucial factor unfavorable to cross-border consolidation is the regional 
fragmentation in EU countries. To be more specific, there are a lot of regional banks 
that reign in the relevant local markets under specialized laws at public or cooperative 
level and this is a limitation for new participants from abroad. Although they could claim 
a share of the retail market via new digitalized technologies the confrontation as 
regards SMEs market is quite uneven. This kind of market still requires interpersonal 
relationships with customers and a branch network, resulting in regional banks having 
the key lender to SMEs role, in many Member States.78 
In addition, the structure of the sector itself raises enough issues, 30% of significant 
eurozone banks are publicly traded and hold almost the 50% of the banking assets in 
euro area, whereas in USA the relevant banks represent the 80% of the sector.  Saving 
banks, regional banks, cooperative banks which constitute the rest 70% of the sector in 
the eurozone are not listed and they often do not pursue standard profit-maximizing 
goals79 , therefore they can maintain a competitive pricing, which could be a 
disincentive for potential foreign acquirers.   Also, due to their legal status they cannot 
be subject to a take over from an ordinary commercial bank through usual M&A 
activity.80 
Moreover, another aspect is the legal obstacles between private banks and cooperative 
banks that function under public law. We find a good example in Germany. A Sparkasse 
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79 Political intervention in the European Banking sector may also set limitations to profit maximising goals. 
See: Nicolas Veron, The governance and ownership of significant euro area banks, Bruegel Policy 
Contribution, No. 2017/15, 1, Bruegel, Brussels, online at 
<https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/173111/1/PC-15-2017.pdf > accessed 7 January 2021.  
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is able to merge with another one, but it is not legally possible to be sold to a private 
entity or to be acquired by a commercial bank under private law. Additionally, there are 
still some national governments across Europe with a political agenda determined by 
the national champion concept.81 
Regarding the single rulebook, the existence of Directives along with Regulations, can 
provoke a negative impact, given the fact that before their implementation, they need 
to be shifted to national law via parliamentary procedures, which often involves 
national peculiarities. Moreover, national authorities are provided options and 
discretions according to banking legislation, ending up having the application of 
different rules across EU countries.82 A number of options and national discretions 
(ONDs) are provided by the Capital Requirements Directive (CRD) and Capital 
Requirements Regulation (CRR) performed by national supervisory authority or passed 
through national legislation. These options and discretions reflect the different legal 
systems among different Member States and create an uneven environment, raise 
complexity, costs and overall make it difficult to compare the capital positions of 
banks.83 
Another impediment is the way international systematically important banks are being 
treated from a regulatory perspective. Stricter capital requirements are imposed on 
them due to their interrelation. Simultaneously the banks from the participated in SSM 
Member States are not treated as a single jurisdiction in order for the G-SIB capital 
buffers to be calculated. By this way USA cross-border banks for instance could have 
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lower capital requirements than the respective ones in euro area, albeit the fact that 
the latter belong to a Banking Union.84 
Furthermore, the regulation omits to identify possible advantages connected to 
geographical diversity of exposures. According to literature cross-national 
diversification eliminates the banking risk. Empirical evidence from European countries 
that confronted a harsh banking crisis (ie Spain, Italy) confirm that their international 
banks (banks in their jurisdiction with international activity) had a better response to 
the crisis than the domestic ones, the former actually contributed to the restriction of 
economic stress. The aforementioned geographical diversification is not considered 
when it comes to calculation of Pillar 1 requirements from the aspect of risk weighted 
assets, or the assessment of risk regarding banks obligated to additional capital under 
Pillar 2.85 
Additionally, a significant issue is raised by the banking legislation in relation with pan-
European groups. Typically, they have the obligation to comply with liquidity and capital 
requirements for both the subsidiaries and the consolidated balance sheet, which is 
also the base for the MREL calculation, but there is an open field for national authorities 
to enforce extra requirements as regards the national subsidiaries. The latter could be 
considered a measure of ring fencing, while at the same time could deprive the relevant 
banks of the ability to contribute the resources within the groups. These extra 
requirements could be justified on the grounds that there is no official commitment for 
the subsidiaries to be covered by the parent company in a case of a financial shock in 
conjunction with the absence of a common insurance scheme, which could trigger local 
taxpayers bearing the burden of the foreign bank’s subsidiary. Further questioning 
arises due to the fact that the completion of the financing and also the foundation of a 
backstop concerning the SRF are still in process, a fundamental factor related to the 
too-big-to-fail banks resolution. By and large the above spectrum has a discouragement 
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impact on banks determination to expand to other national jurisdictions, albeit the 
group financial support agreements introduced by the BRRD.86 
All the above-mentioned impediments to cross-border consolidation across EU 
countries, promote specific banking structures resulting in less financial integration, 
which ultimately does not serve sufficiently the financial stability in the Single Market. 
 
2.2.4   The impact of European Banking Integration on sustainable economic   growth 
 
Sustainable growth in European Union could be facilitated and revived through the 
integration of a financial system, able to provide a rapid and effectual response to any 
potential negative occurrence, based upon the integration of the European banking 
sector. To this end substantial adjustment of the Banking sector needs to take place, in 
terms of unrestrained flows of financial services and channels to produce cross-border 
capital. The contribution of the financial institutions in economic growth consists of the 
reduction of transactional costs as well as the reduction of asymmetric information, 
therefore financial development is a crucial prerequisite for economic growth. They also 
conduce to identification of investment bargains, gainful projects, diversification of risk 
and trading.  Their role is a pivotal condition in vital sectors of economy such as energy, 
trade, agriculture and many more, thereby the more effective the credit sector can be 
the better the monetary policy can be served. 87 
A research88 among EU Member States for the period 2004-2018 confirms the positive 
and important impact of banking integration on the sustainability of economic growth.  
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The experience of the recent financial crisis had a negative effect on banking 
integration, namely a deterioration of cross-border activities and as a corollary a 
negative impact on economic growth, reflected in unemployment rates and inflation. 
The relevant period could be considered as a period of disintegration, given the 
fragmented financial flows.89  
Additionally, other findings90 identify an enhanced tendency of positive interaction 
between banking integration and the economic sustainability of old Member States and 
the eurozone, especially in the prior to the financial crisis period. The issue of non – 
performing loans is also underlined in connection with their reduction, given the fact 
that they have been proved to be a crucial catalyst of banking crisis events. 
Moreover, international and cross-border integration are featured as the most 
important forms of financial integration. Internationalization is a significant channel to 
ensure the preservation of a fruitful framework, in terms of financial novelty and 
securitization. On the other hand, the broader context of banking integration should be 
conceived as a condition characterized by a single price, where all market participants, 
within EU, will have the ability and the option to commercialize on the same and most 
propitious terms. 91 
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3. Empirical evidence: The paradigm of Spain 
Between 2009-2011 Spain’s banking sector experienced a far-reaching restructuring 
transformation, mainly through mergers and acquisitions, triggered by the real estate 
collapse in the context of the financial crisis. Although, the specific banking system was 
characterized by certain peculiarities, such as the Cajas, the inordinate leverage, which 
stemmed from the real estate explosion and the dependence of Spanish banks on the 
wholesale international markets, literally formed a conventional type of a banking 
crisis.92  
At the onset of the GFC, Spain’ s government did not have to deal with over – borrowing 
issues, unlike some other countries in Europe (Italy, Greece).  Spain was kept under strict 
compliance with all the requirements set by the Maastricht Treaty. Nevertheless, after 
the introduction of the Euro, a large part of citizens and corporations got engaged in 
cheap credit, up to a degree that they could not afford it, therefore nearly a year before 
the subprime mortgage crisis of USA, the deceptive development and growth in Spain, 
was already comprehensive enough. By 2009 the surpluses of the Spanish budget had 
turned into deficits, exceeding 11% of the GDP. Apart from the international crisis the 
country also had to manage a domestic one and later in 2010, the Euro crisis, which had 
affected the sustainability of the public debt. Although the State did not have an 
extensive deficit, the fact that provided guarantees to   savings banks, intimidated the 
markets, which in turn raised the rates for borrowing. The interruption of the country’s 
growth and development in conjunction with the real estate market breakdown 
unveiled the problem of the ailing Spanish savings banks (Cajas). A private debt crisis 
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was transformed into a public debt crisis ending up affecting every aspect of life in the 
country.93 
 
The Spanish Savings Banks (Cajas) 
 
Savings banks (Cajas) had a long, successful history and never been affected before by a 
crisis therefore they had always played a crucial role in the Spanish banking sector.  In 
2007 they represented the 50% of the Spanish financial system. Initially they had a 
purely charitable and cultural orientation functioning on a specific territorial basis, using 
people’ s savings for investment, providing social services to the relevant community 
and granting loans to customers with reputable solvency. They differed from 
commercial banks, given the fact that they were non-profit entities, not publicly traded 
and   without shareholders. Based on territorial operations, with low interest rates and 
a close interaction with their customers, they had developed a strong banking model 
with excessive earnings. Through time they were subject to several institutional 
changes, accompanied by increased participation of public authorities (usually persons 
from local or regional government) in their governing bodies, became similar with 
commercial banks and after a liberalization wave in 1988 they had the ability to expand 
across the country. In early 2000s after the elimination of differences, from a financial 
perspective, they resembled to commercial banks and they were also players of free 
competition in the market. Instead of the traditional lending mode in the past they 
adopted new more aggressive tactics. From 9.386 in 1979 they were up to 24.202 in 
2009, while at the same time they were aiming at new customers via new more complex 
products. During the Great Moderation94 period and early participation in the 
Eurogroup, Spain experienced a decade of     constant growth and development. In this 
 
93 Amalia Cardenas, Internet Interdisciplinary Institute, Open University of Catalonia, Working Paper, The 
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paper-series.uoc.edu/in3/ca/index.php/in3-working-paper-series/article/view/1943/0.html > accessed 
21 December 2020. 
94 Great Moderation: the name given to the period of decreased macroeconomic volatility experienced in 
the United States from the mid-1980s to the financial crisis in 2007;  Domenico Giannone, Michele Lenza, 
Luchrezia Reichlin Explaining the Great Moderation:  It is not the shocks, Journal of the European Economic 
Association, Volume 6, Issue 2-3, 2008,  621–633, online at <  https://doi.org/10.1162/JEEA.2008.6.2-
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context the construction and building sector were blooming. The building boom in Spain 
was similar with the one in USA.  Savings banks had an intense presence in all this either 
by providing financial resources for developments or mortgage credit.95 
 
The problem   
 
High dependency of the savings banks on the construction sector and the real estate, 
which were exposed to enormous bank credit as any other typical bubble ready to 
explode at any time, was the heart of the problem. A large number of them went after 
acquiring some real estate firms, which was considered a rapid way to gain profits at the 
time, while others granted loans to real estate developers under very loose conditions. 
According to a study from Ernst & Young, Spain was exposed to non-performing loans 
up to € 190b.96 The causes for the persistent focus of the sector to this type of practices 
were the low interest rates, which actually promoted accessibility to cheap credit but 
also the governmental stance and policy which propagated property over rental. On the 
other hand, the evolution and growth of both real estate and construction sector 
generated a lot of tax revenues, decreased unemployment levels and increased property 
prices.97 
Savings banks in the effort to support the amplification of their balance sheets in lieu of 
strengthening their resources by pursuing a proliferation of deposits for instance, 
referred to the wholesale international financial markets, on a mortgage bond basis 
among other new financial instruments. They extensively used securitization in order to 
back up bonds for the refinancing of mortgage portfolios. In addition, due to legal 
restrictions they did not have the option to resort to capital markets and therefore they 
had to rely upon retaining earnings and the wholesale funding.  
 
95 Pablo Martin -Acena, The savings banks crisis in Spain: When and how?  World Savings and Retail 
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97 Amalia Cardenas, Internet Interdisciplinary Institute, Open University of Catalonia, Working Paper, The 
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Simultaneously, the fragmented banking sector into small entities generated excess 
capacity problems in the market.  When the collapse of the real estate sector occurred 
an enormous number of unsold houses and incomplete developments were left behind 
along with a huge number of non-performing loans. 
Another parameter of the problem was the peculiarity of their origin itself. As 
mentioned before, their traditional mandate was strong connected to welfare benefits 
for specific communities by promoting growth and development in the relevant regions. 
In addition, as far as their governance was concerned, there was a serious divergence 
from the international standards of corporate governance. The participation of local or 
regional governmental representatives strongly affected the investment decisions and 
practices. Ultimately, their original beneficial banking model, focused before on specific 
areas, closely to regional customers, marketing simple financial products, was not 
sufficient anymore. The aggravation of the crisis brought a gradual decline of their 
profits and their reserves, as well, which were their basic backstop, given the fact that 
from a legal perspective they did not have the option to issue shares, since they were 
only foundations.  
After the rescue of the first savings banks, in March 2009, Caja de Castilla – La Mancha, 
via the purchase of € 593m non – performing loans by the FGDCA (a guarantee fund) 
and an additional fund of € 2.5b, required for the sale of the Caja, it was more than 
obvious to the relevant authorities that this was not a single problematic situation while 
simultaneously they started to consider for the first time in a decade the expanded size 
of the savings banks’ structure.98 
 
The response: a consolidation program (FROB 1)                                
 
Between November 2009 – December 2010 a consolidation program took place for the 
restructuring of the banking sector in Spain according to which the number of savings 
banks fell from 37 to 12: 
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 Spain not being able to manage the situation, submitted a request to the European 
assistance funds. After the European Union’s decision to transfer the rescue money to a 
fund, set up and organized by the Spanish government, in the effort to prevent a 
contagion event to other Member States, on 27 June 2009, a special public fund was 
established, based on the Royal Decree – Law 9/2009, it was the Fund for the Orderly 
Restructuring of the Banking Sector (FROB), an innovative toolkit at the time, which 
would provide guarantees to Cajas in danger to default and would also involve   three 
phases. Today it represents the Spanish executive resolution authority in the 
SRMcontext. 99 The FROB had a twofold mandate, to enhance intervention mechanisms 
for the troubled institutions, whose problems had an impact on their viability, and also 
restructure the sector in order to confront excess capacity and inefficiency issues via 
consolidation. By this way ailing banks would   increase their size and obtain better 
accessibility to financial markets. It supported solvency, by providing funds, in order to 
facilitate mergers. To this end it had € 9b available.  Ultimately, a part of this money was 
used for the materialization of eight mergers.100 Under the first phase of the program 
(FROB 1) the problematic savings banks had the possibility to come into possession of 
public capital through the FROB, provided they would have submitted a consolidation 
scheme, the rest of them could just integrate. As a result, in the period November 2009 
– December 2010, all the major savings banks materialized a consolidation. The 
valuation of their assets counted to € 1.300b, a number close to the value of assets of 
all US M&As for the years 2009 and 2010.101 
 
99 Jaime Ponce Huerta, Chairman of FROB, FROB IN THE RESTRUCTURING OF THE SPANISH BANKING 
SYSTEM. WHERE IT STANDS AFTER A DECADE OF ACTIVITY (2009-2019) AND CONSIDERATIONS FOR THE 
BANKING UNION,  Banco de Espana , Financial Stability review, issue 36, 25, online at < 
https://www.bde.es/f/webbde/GAP/Secciones/Publicaciones/InformesBoletinesRevistas/RevistaEstabili
dadFinanciera/19/mayo/FROB_in_the_restructuring.pdf > ; Sergio Mayordomo, Banco de Espana, Nicola 
Pavanini, Tilburg University School of Economics and Management and Emanuele Tarantino University of 
Mannheim - Department of Economics; Tilburg Law and Economics Center (TILEC), The Impact of 
Alternative Forms of Bank Consolidation on Credit Supply and Financial Stability, Banco de Espana, 
Working Paper No2021, 11, online at < https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3648114 > 
accessed 23 December 2020.  
 
100 Joaquin Maudos   University of Valencia and Xavier Vives IESE Business School, Banking in Spain, The 
Palgrave Handbook of European Banking, 2016, Palgrave Macmillan, 589-590. 
 
101 Sergio Mayordomo, Banco de Espana, Nicola Pavanini, Tilburg University School of Economics and 
Management and Emanuele Tarantino University of Mannheim - Department of Economics; Tilburg Law 
and Economics Center (TILEC), The Impact of Alternative Forms of Bank Consolidation on Credit Supply 
   
  -40- 
According to the Royal Decree – Law 9/2009 the Spanish savings banks had two options, 
either to consolidate through an M&A or to form a SIP (System for Institutional 
Protection), a type of business group, quite different to an ordinary M&A.  SIP banks 
were obligated to conform a new centralized risk management system, their regulatory 
requirements would be calculated on a consolidated basis, they would have a duration 
of at least ten years and they would have a mutual commitment on liquidity and 
solvency assistance. The main difference compared to M&As was that the SIP banks 
remained independent legal entities, consequently they provided less centralization 
than M&As. The option of SIP banks had been selected by the cross regional institutions, 
whereas those operating in the same region proceeded to M&As.  The Bank of Spain 
was competent to render the approval for the consolidation of the institutions, taking 
under consideration their viability.102  
The second phase of the program focused on solvency improvement and   FROB had the 
discretion to buy banks’ shares.  Finally, in the third phase two more Royal Decree - Laws 
(2/2012 & 18/2012) were passed which involved the cleaning up of the balance sheets 
with increased requirements as regards foreclosed assets. 
During the first phase of the program the field of savings banks changed dramatically, 
through mergers, in the second one some savings banks turned into private ones and in 
the third phase a few mergers also followed aligned with the Spanish government’s 
intention for strong private banks. 
After a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) in 2012 between Spain and the European 
Commission, the country was granted   € 100b under specific conditions. This 
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Memorandum which came along with the bail-out of the Spanish banking sector, 
opened the route that Spanish banks had taken in order to escape the crisis.103 
 
 
The success of the program 
 
The extended restructuring through the consolidation program along with some reforms 
of the savings banks that followed, resulted in write – offs, reduction of excess capacity, 
enhancement of solvency and liquidity. 
The Spanish banks from being bailed out in 2012 managed to return to profitability and 
successfully pass the ECB’s stress test in November 2014.104 
It is noteworthy that a valid analysis based on this specific restructuring process 
highlights that although bank mergers induce a reduction of credit supply and an 
increase in interest rates, especially as far as SMEs are concerned, they do produce 
reduction of non-performing loans, thereby they contribute to the enhancement of 
financial stability. All in all, the gains from financial stability excess the losses from the 
reduction of credit supply.105  
In addition, we should bear in mind that savings banks are rather common in Europe. In 
Germany they stand for the one third of the total assets of the sector and they 
encountered problems during the crisis. Italy also had, after the crisis, some ailing 
savings banks with NPL problems.106 
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The paradigm of Spain can also be seen from another perspective. Ultimately the 
completion of the EBU will provide a truly single banking market in Europe   and may 
induce a more competitive banking field. In this context, at some point European banks 
will have to take heavily under consideration cross-border mergers, based on the 
grounds that geographical diversification and exposure, is a path that can lead to the 
reduction of future risk. During the crisis of the Spanish banking sector Santander and 
BBVA, the two largest banks in the country, were able to weather the storm more 
effectively, due to the fact that a large part of their operations were conducted in many 
and different countries.107 
 
4. A comparison with the USA Banking System  
 
The parameters that characterize the Euro area are the common currency, the Single 
Market, the discretion to form a European Company (Societas Europaea), the single 
passport for all the financial firms, and after the creation of the EBU a common banking 
supervisory and resolution mechanism. Albeit the fact that the United States represent 
a full nation state, they are deemed to be the only point of reference, on the grounds of 
an economy comparable to magnitude, financial development, also with a common 
currency and a federal banking supervision and resolution authority. Thereby, the 
comparison between the European banking system and the USA banking system seems 
more relevant than a respective one with totally independent nation - states. 
However, despite the similarities there is a determining factor of differentiation. The 
USA banking system is entirely integrated. On the other hand, in the absence of the 
realization of the third pillar of EBU, namely the deposit insurance scheme in 
conjunction with the financing of the SRF and the creation of its backstop still on process, 
the European banking system, although under the auspices of a Banking Union, remains 
segmented across national lines with little deep cross-border integration. 
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This is even indicated by the number of cross-state M&A dealings in the USA during the 
period 2000-2016. The percentage ranks between 31% and 52% of the aggregate 
number of dealings, whereas the respective percentage for the Euro area is 5% and 19% 
for the same period. 108  
Additionally, it is noteworthy that the market-to-book ratios for the period 2007 -2017, 
regarding the EU and USA banks, marks a significant divergence. Taking under 
consideration the profitability outcome, the main factor for the evaluation, ROA seems 
to have been substantially enhanced for the USA, in the post-GFC period, while 
persistently subdued in Europe. The results can be explained on the grounds of cost 
efficiency amelioration in the USA and the stressed net interest margin in relation with 
EU banks.109 
Moreover, as regards the safety and soundness of a banking system, a major concern 
for economy, especially after the financial crisis, a recent research of Papadimitriou – 
Gogas- Agrapetidou, on the USA banking system, highlights that although there had 
been an impairment of the safety margin which later resulted to the financial crisis of 
2007, in the forthcoming years until 2015, the safety margin in relation to operational 
productiveness and capital adequacy had been improved , suggesting a resilient banking 
system, able to confront a financial shock without  the determination of outer 
assistance.110 
The USA banking integration is a factor equivalent to the resilience of risk sharing, able 
to provide a safeguard during economic shocks, as evidenced by the recent financial 
crisis. Unlike the EU banking system, which is limited to interbank integration and little 
profound cross-border one, it has been fully expanded to interstate integration too, 
which ultimately has played a crucial role in its structure and performance. Interbank 
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integration does not provide the same advantages as the cross-border banking, given 
the fact that renders the local banking systems more vulnerable to worldwide shocks 
and simultaneously does not decrease the consequences of a local banking shock on a 
domestic level. 
According to empirical evidence, in the event of a global shock, banking integration 
through the channel of cross-border lending to firms and households, can provide a 
more solid safeguard rather than the cross-border lending between banks from different 
states.111 
In the distant past the banking sector of both EU and the USA used to be fragmented. 
Yet, they adopted a different approach to pursue integration focused on two essential 
modes. In the context of the Single Market, EU had already set from the beginning a 
long- term goal for a single banking market too, while the USA did not have any drivers 
for long-term objectives. Instead of that, the USA progressively proceeded to this 
direction as a response to evolutionary events. The second difference was that the USA 
incentivized banks earlier, since the creation of the banking system, to be supervised on 
a federal basis under the condition of providing them a safety net. On the other hand, 
EU due to the absence of a centralized fiscal union and the political resistance before 
the GFC regarding a common supervision and a common safety net, tried to make an 
effort by harmonizing banking regulation and deregulating cross-border branching.  
The Second Banking Directive (1977) introduced the single passport, according to which 
an entity with authorization for banking operations in one EU Member State, was also 
authorized to establish branches in any other EU Member State, under the supervision 
of the home-country. The single passport was indeed a resourceful way to support cross-
border banking and promote competition at the same time among national supervisors. 
However, de novo branching (the establishment of new cross-border branches) never 
managed to produce the desirable single market for banking services. The major 
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prerequisite for banking operations is a considerable cognizance of the local market, 
therefore opening new branches proved to have been less effectual than the acquisition 
of an already established bank with market experience but even in a case of this option 
the necessary approval by the national supervisor proved to have been a serious 
obstacle, given the concept of national champions and the tendency to prevent external 
competition.  
The introduction of the Euro in 1998, although a benchmark in EU history, did not induce 
cross-border M&As. On the contrary most of the banking mergers and acquisitions that 
took place during the relevant period, remained domestic. Only after the inauguration 
of Euro in 2000, there was an increase in cross-border consolidation in Europe but still 
domestic takeovers in EU overshadowed the respective ones in USA.112 
From a historical perspective banking in USA had been under a strict governmental 
regulation. The USA constitution prohibited the issuance of paper money by the states 
as well as the taxation of interstate commerce. Thereby the states were induced in order 
to generate profits to grant bank charters. It is comprehensible enough that the ban of 
interstate banking actually stemmed from the fiscal policy of the states themselves. 
Moreover, they also limited the geographical expansion of banks within the state lines, 
creating by this way monopolies or even obstructed banks under unit banking laws, to 
open branches.113 Consequently, banks had tried to overcome the constraints by 
creating holding companies which were able to acquire banks within and outside the 
state borders. Additionally, based on the holding company’ s structure, a bank could 
come into possession of a branch. Some banks had also tried to outwit the law by 
creating multibank holding companies, which operated in many states, but this came to 
a stop by the 1956 amendments to Banking Holding Company Act.114 Nevertheless, 
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during the period 1970-1994 a large part of the states, gradually  affected by the 
emergence of new technologies in banking operations,  diminished the relevant 
restrictions for branching, by allowing multibank holding companies to transform the 
subsidiaries into branches and also gave the permission for the establishment of new 
branches within their borders. As regards the cross-state ownership, it was also 
forbidden by states until 1980. In 1978 reciprocity laws came along, according to which 
a state would permit entrance by a holding company of another state, if in return 
holding companies of this state were also admitted there. Until 1992, all states except 
Hawaii, had passed reciprocity laws. Branching through the M&A process was the first 
to take place, in most of the cases.  Finally, the historic banking legislation of the Riegle-
Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficient Act of 1994, allowed the entry of any 
bank or holding company to any state.115 Following   the removal of geographical 
restrictions, the larger banks unfurled across broader geographic areas. Thus, after 
deregulation banks pursued entry to new markets but they were not induced to 
consolidate within local lines, given the fact that previous restrictions did not apply to 
local markets anyway, with only exception some states under the unit banking laws.  
Subsequently after the interstate banking deregulation acquisitions proliferated 
strongly. On the contrary, there was no substantial increase as regards banking 
acquisition after the branching deregulation.116 The change in the US banking system 
was fundamental, from strongly restricted within local lines became increasingly 
integrated on a national level. The number of multistate entities were more than double 
from 1990 to 2005. Customers were enjoying banking services provided out of the state 
where the entity ‘s main office was settled.  
In terms of competition despite market concentration on a national level, there was no 
corresponding one on a local level, based on the contribution of antitrust policies 
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preventing mergers that could potentially increase concentration.  In general, albeit the 
lifting of restrictions, which resulted in a more consolidated banking system, there was 
not a decrease on competition level, on the grounds of more diversification and better 
efficiency characteristics of banking entities operating in a broader geographical area. In 
addition, the whole phenomenon had a positive impact on economic growth and 
development given the fact that an efficient banking system supports better the real 
economy because better finance is a driver for more innovation development and 
growth.  
Following the integration process, banks became more efficient with significant cost 
reductions reflected in the pricing of banking operations and services. Through the 
acquisition of less gainful banks the most profitable ones managed to enhance their 
market share. 
Additionally, another advantage that occurred due to the lifting of interstate 
restrictions, was the expansion of entrepreneurship operations, since SMEs managed to 
pursue better access to credit. Overall, the diversification of banks’ portfolios 
contributed significantly to the reduction of volatility and therefore enhanced economic 
stability.117 
The value of interstate integration in the USA banking system in conjunction with the 
earlier creation of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) back in 1933, was 
profoundly manifested during the GFC on the grounds that generated the coordinated 
and centralized response of the USA banking system, whereas the EU being fragmented 
without a common supervision and a safety net prior to the crisis resulted in a 
decentralized reaction and intolerable costs for certain sovereigns.  
The contribution of FDIC in reducing the cost to the USA economy was significant, given 
the fact that it was able to market failed banks across state boundaries without any 
considerations of political or economic impact as regards the allocation of banks’ losses 
across the relevant states. Simultaneously the deposit insurance provided by a single 
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agency instead of fifty states, limited the consequences of bank losses in some of 
them.118 
Ultimately the funds provided by taxpayers in EU to address the problem of stressed 
domestic banks were almost 8% of the bloc’s GDP from 2008-2014 and those financial 
resources were partly recovered. On the other hand, the financial resources   for the 
troubled institutions in USA were up to 245b USD, most of which had been recovered 
and also delivered a profit of 30b USD to the government.119 The USA experience 
illustrates the benefits of lifting legal barriers overcoming policy challenges and finally 
conform a fully integrated banking system able, in a resilient manner, to confront 
financial shocks.   
 
 
5. Conclusion   
 
The outbreak of Covid -19 has changed the perception of the human way of life and 
generated a turmoil effect on real economy.  
The enhanced capital and liquidity buffers of the European Banks enabled them to 
weather the storm, at least for the time being, and along with fiscal monetary and 
prudential policies to continue their operations and provide essential services.  
Yet, the European Banking sector remains susceptible to economic distress, regardless 
the Covid-19 crisis, due to long lasting vulnerabilities that resulted in slow recovery and 
thus low profitability, such as overcapacity, legacy problems (NPLs), low cost – efficiency 
issues. 
Additionally, the landing point of the unprecedented vortex we are currently 
experiencing is difficult to be predicted and significant repercussions on bank balance 
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sheets seems to be an inevitable scenario, given the fact that banks not being able to 
counterbalance potential losses, such as a substantial increase of non -performing loans 
caused by defaulting borrowers during the pandemic, they will not be qualified to avoid 
capital erosion, which may even jeopardize their viability.  
 
The financial and sovereign debt crisis highlighted the deficiencies of the European 
Banking sector and it was the trigger for major reforms. Thus, the relevant downturn 
was transformed to a significant opportunity based on brave policy   initiatives that led 
to the creation of the European Banking Union, under a single supervisory and resolution 
mechanism, the two pillars, aiming at financial stability and resilience of the sector. 
Accordingly, all the challenges stemming from the pandemic should be treated as a 
trigger for further improvements regarding structural deficiencies of the sector, aiming 
not only to weather the current shortfalls, but build a stronger banking system, able to 
withstand any potential future turmoil, a factor that can never be excluded from 
economic cycles. 
 
Under this spectrum, according to empirical evidence and lessons learned from the past, 
consolidation (M&As) both domestic and cross-border, can provide a feasible and 
effectual response, in order to confront existing vulnerabilities of the sector, pursue 
better profitability and ultimately conform a more safe, sound and resilient banking 
system. 
Given the circumstances, it seems more realistic that domestic consolidation could take 
place first and address the overcapacity issues, as well as legacy problems (NPLs), in the 
effort to achieve better balance sheets and enhanced profitability.   
At a later stage, taking under consideration that once more there are some challenges 
in the policy front to be addressed, the amelioration of bank profitability combined with 
potential lifting of legal and policy barriers, could facilitate the performance of more 
cross-border banking. In this context, a crucial policy priority could be, the realization of 
the third pillar of EBU, the deposit insurance scheme, the lack of which imposes certain 
limitations to a potential large – scale combination, since it can lead to national options 
and discretions that deter a cross – border group from functioning seamlessly across the 
Eurozone. In addition, cross – border consolidation could be  a crucial factor that can 
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result to a deeply integrated banking system able to contribute to the completion of a 
real Banking Union, with more diversification, risk sharing, less volatility, thus, financial 
stability, more resilience and economic growth, able to confront not only current 
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